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Abstract 
The paper analyses the experience carried out by the Uniconti Commission in setting rules 
of uniform costing in Italy during the World War II (WWII). This initiative was promoted 
by the Italian Fascist government and the Confederazione dell’Industria (Industry 
Confederation) in 1941. The purpose of the paper is to investigate the process of setting 
the uniform costing rules and “why” and “how” they were designed, according to a 
Foucauldian perspective that allows the problematization of accounting as a complex 
phenomenon, whose emergence and functioning is linked to the context and dependent 
on the interplay of different influences.  
Starting from the aims inspired to the totalitarian ideology of the government that 
promoted the Commission, the analysis is grounded on archival primary sources and 
provides the perspective of the making of new accounting rules by the interplay among 
the participants acting in the process. This allows focusing the interaction between the 
domains of interests and of expectations - political-ideological, technical and economic - 
that the process of setting the uniform costing system in that context implied. The 
outcome of the Commission represented a compromise between the stances of the 
accounting academy, the interests of business representatives, the dominant ideology and 
the political targets.  
Thus, the paper provides insightful evidence of the complex interplay between 
knowledge, techniques, institutions and ideology in setting accounting rules in a 
totalitarian context, marked by a prevailing role of ideology and state in the regulation of 
economy.  
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Introduction 
The research presented in this paper is based on the documented experience conducted in 
1941 by the Commissione Uniconti (Uniconti Commission). The Commission was 
promoted by the Confederazione dell’Industria (Industry Confederation) and by the 
Fascist Government to study uniform standardized procedures in accounting and schemes 
for financial and cost accounting practices. In this respect, the Uniconti Commission acted 
as an accounting standard setter in Italy during the WWII.  
In reporting this experience, the research contributes to shed light on the relationship 
between accounting and society, in a way that makes accounting not a purely technical 
matter. The paper provides an interpretation of accounting change using a “genealogical” 
approach, i.e. by looking in detail at the archival documents related to cases or events at 
one period in the history of accounting, and examining the interplay between knowledge, 
power, techniques, institutions of the context (Foucault, 1977; Loft, 1986; Hopwood, 
1987; Miller and Napier, 1993; Kearins and Hooper, 2002). Most of the “genealogical” 
research in accounting history seeks to illuminate the power/knowledge relationships 
embedded in historical context and the role of accounting as a “technique of knowledge” 
through which power is exercised (Loft, 1986).  
More broadly, this Foucauldian framework allows the problematization of accounting as 
a complex phenomenon, whose emergence and functioning is linked to the context and 
dependent on the interplay of many different influences. This perspective is far from that 
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of accounting history interpreted as a deterministic, unidimensional linear progress, or 
accounting practices “as the timeless products of the need for information for decision 
making or control, or the push for efficiency.” (Stewart, 1992). Thus, it contributes to the 
stance of “new” accounting history (Miller et al., 1991).  
The Foucault’s framework  (1982) identifies the elements which are essential to analyze 
power relations, namely: the system of differentiations (e.g. cultural, economic or 
knowledge-based), the types of objectives pursued (e.g. maintain privileges or 
accumulate profits), the meanings of bringing power relations into being (e.g. by means 
economic disparities or by surveillance), the forms of institutionalisations of power (e.g. 
through law), the degrees of rationalisation for the exercise of power (Kearins and 
Hooper, 2002). 
In the paper, a description is made of the context under which the new accounting rules 
and techniques were fixed by providing a documented account of the ideological and 
historical conditions of the period and by analysing the documental evidence of the work 
of the Uniconti Commission to set the uniform accounting rules. Further, starting from 
the aims of the Italian fascist government that promoted the Commission, the different 
interests and knowledge expressed by the participants to the process are unveiled. Thus, 
the visibility of the interplay among the actors of the process of rules setting (the German 
ally, representatives of institutions, academy and enterprises) highlights the interaction 
between the domains of interests and knowledge – political, ideological, technical and 
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economic – in that process of setting a uniform costing system. Through the minutes of 
the Commission meetings, these different roles are depicted in action into the dynamic of 
making the new accounting rules. 
This way, the research on the Uniconti Commission highlights the dialectic among 
different actors participating and the presence in the accounting discourse of a complex 
interaction between knowledge, interests, institutions and ideology. The dynamic of this 
interplay is at the base of the possibility to appreciate accounting as a social – not merely 
technical – activity (Loft, 1986). 
In this exploration the paper also provides evidence of the impact in the accounting field 
of the prominent role of the State in the last century, especially in the period of war 
economy (Armstrong, 1987; Loft, 1986), recognizing this role as a driver of change in 
accounting practices within a definite historical, political, and ideological context 
(Gilling, 1976; Hopwood et al., 1979; Miller, 1990; Miller et al., 1991; Canziani, 1994). 
In particular, the paper contributes to this theme with reference to one of the European 
States experiencing a socio-political context of totalitarism between the two World Wars. 
Accounting in such a context is still little explored in accounting history.  Although the 
theme of accounting and ideology has been faced in accounting from different 
perspectives (e.g. Anthony et al., 1982; Robson et al., 1994; Cooper, 1995), few studies 
have been conducted in accounting history to explore the relationships between the 
totalitarian ideology of the State that affected a significant number of the European 
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countries between the two World Wars, and accounting. Among these, Walker (2000) 
documented how the 5th International Congress on Accounting held in Berlin in 1938 
represented for the Nazi regime a significant opportunity to promote the national socialist 
ideology applied to the development of accounting, while Cinquini (2007) explored how 
the strong ideological commitment of Fascism had an influence on the field of accounting 
and business studies in Italy, on the degree of adhesion to the ‘corporative’ ideology of 
part of academics and on subjects and post-war development of accounting and business 
research in Italy. With respect to the research stream on the linkages between the ideology 
and accounting in the totalitarian State of the last century, this paper contributes by 
considering the importance of ideology in the process and direction of change within the 
accounting domain. In shedding light on the influence the German ally had in the work 
of the Uniconti Commission in the development of uniform costing rules in Italy, a facet 
is unveiled on the role the ideological foundation of the State may play in the accounting 
discourse: the political and ideological affinity between Italy and Germany at that time, 
in fact, constituted an influencial condition in the Italian process of accounting rules 
setting described in the paper, considering also the results that Germany had achieved in 
accounting standardization. 
Further, the experience of the Uniconti Commission supplements and enriches the 
accounting history research on the uniform accounting movements that characterized the 
industrialized countries since the beginning of the last century (Mueller, 1965) within 
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different institutional contexts and with different aims (Mitchell and Walker, 1996 and 
1997; Ahmed and Scapens, 2003; Zelinschi, 2009; Singer, 1943; Solomons, 1950)1. More 
broadly, the research contributes to the stream of accounting history research on the 
accounting trends that significantly characterized the industrialized countries since the 
beginning of the last century (Bisman, 2012). 
In this respect, this study further disseminates and extends the findings of an Italian article 
(Cinquini et al., 2009). The previous research has been theoretically refocussed, enriched, 
refined and integrated with further archival evidence and interpretation of the findings. 
The “genealogical” perspective adopted in this paper aims to investigate the 
power/knowledge relationships (ideological, political, economic and academic) among 
the actors involved in designing accounting rules. Therefore, new evidence concerning 
the Italian government, the academicians and the business representatives were extracted, 
analysed and interpreted from the documents database used in the previous research 
(Cinquini et al., 2009). This new documental analysis has highlighted the influence of the 
different actors - with their objectives and the emerging of power relations - on the design 
of accounting rules. In this way a new contribution has been obtained, illuminating the 
presence of a complex interaction between knowledge, interests, institutions and ideology 
in the accounting discourse. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a section in which the method 
adopted and the documental sources are discussed, the paper presents a section with the 
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background of accounting standardization in Italy between the two World Wars. The 
subsequent sections are based on the archival documents collected: the fourth section 
deals with the expectations of the government in establishing the Commission and the 
influence on its work of the previous German experience in uniform costing, by reporting 
the evidence of a specific bilateral meeting in 1942; the fifth section focuses on the 
expectations and interplay among the main actors of the process (politics, business, 
academy). The sixth section provides insights in the orientation of the accounting 
solutions, presenting a discussion of the critical aspects of the main documents 
constituting the outcome of the Commission. These considerations will be the basis for 
the discussion and conclusions section, based on the significance of the Uniconti 
Commission experience in the ideological, political and economic context in which it was 
established and worked and on the contributions of this paper in accounting history 
research. 
 
Research method and archival sources 
The methodological perspective assumed in this investigation, as aforementioned in the 
Introduction, is that of the “new accounting history” realm (Miller et al., 1991), i.e. a 
critical research “grounded firmly in the archive” (Carnegie and Napier, 1996). In the 
vein of “new accounting history”, research breaks away from the traditional evolutionary 
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approach of “reading the past in the light of the present” and aims at looking for 
interactions within space and time in which accounting developed.  
In particular, this paper can be considered within the “critical history” stream of research, 
as it aims at emphasizing the relationship between accounting and its organizational, 
social and political content and the extent at which accountancy may reflect and influence 
the economic, institutional, political and social environments (Burchell et al., 1980; 
Hopwood, 1983; Previts et al., 1990a; Carnegie and Napier, 1996, 2012; Fleischman et 
al., 1996; Parker, 1997, 1999; Napier, 2006). Changes in theory and practice of 
accounting are not considered as occurred in a vacuum, but are rather influenced by the 
dynamics of (public or private) institutions that claim a social, political and economic 
role: their interactions carry out a regulatory function on accounting theory and practices. 
Therefore, institutional, social, economic and political conditions have to be extensively 
considered and understood for a study of trends and change in accounting theories and 
practices (Hopwood et al., 1979; Hopwood, 1987). 
In reporting and interpreting the work performed by Uniconti Commission the paper 
adopts a narrative research approach aiming to establish and/or describe items of fact 
and to relate episodes in a particular, specific, non-analytical manner. This narrative 
approach is considered as opposite to approaches in history which are rigorously 
patterned in the investigative style of the physical sciences (interpretational) (Previts et 
al., 1990a; 1990b).  
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In this research, the narrative is rooted on primary sources gathered in the Historical 
Archive of Confindustria (the Italian industrial confederation of entrepeneurs). In this 
respect, it can be considered in the stream of those studies in accounting history 
concerning accounting rule-making, in which “(…) it is important to enquire into what 
factors have impacted on the growing concern with the standardization of accounting 
practice in both the private and public sectors.” (Carnegie and Napier, 1996: p. 25). This 
way, the relevance of the contribution that an archival research may give to the accounting 
history finds confirmation, particularly if conducted with reference to the period between 
the two World Wars in Europe. 
An ad-hoc accounting standard setter is considered (the Uniconti Commission) in its 
establishment and work by using primary archival sources. In fact, the research is based 
on documents, minutes and letters reporting the work of the Commission and on the 
papers related to the issues found as annexes to the minutes. The archival sources 
examined are listed in Appendix 12. In addition, secondary sources have been considered, 
namely publications of Italian Scholars reporting on that experience and other books and 
papers on the accounting topics under discussion.  
Considering the archival sources, two main stages can be identified in the rules- setting 
work carried out by the Commission in the period 1941-1942. In a first stage the 
Commission worked having more operating purposes and defined general principles to 
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unify accounting practices for all the industry sectors, with a total of 13 meetings since 
December 13th, 1941 up to September 17th, 1942 (see Appendix 2). 
Then a second work stage began. The Commission created special Sub-Commissions for 
categories of businesses, whose task was to resolve the specific problems of the specific 
industry sector based on general preset criteria. A total of 40 Subcommittees were 
established, only 23 of which actually operated and delivered its report to the 
Commission. The work of the Commission was focused on the manufacturing industry, 
with the explicit exclusion of banks and insurance companies from the accounting 
unification project, and with the indication to postpone its application in commercial 
companies to the future. The idea of focusing on accounting unification efforts in the 
manufacturing industry was connected with the public procurement sector, consistently 
with the Government objective: to reduce public expenditure, mainly due to the war, 
through a control of the pricing processes and, consequently, of the prices of suppliers.  
The dramatic war events escalation in Italy in 1943 stopped the project, which was never 
resumed afterwards and did not produce factual results, as there were no time and space 
for implementation.  
Before deepening the content of the documents and their interpretation in the 
aforementioned perspective, in the next section a concise background on accounting 
standardization in Fascist Italy is provided as a contextual frame. 
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Backgrounds: the issue of accounting standardization in Fascist Italy  
After Mussolini’s rise to power in 1922, a new economic policy agenda was issued in 
Italy in the name of the building of the “corporative economy” that was tentatively 
developed throughout the ‘30s3. 
Notwithstanding the role of this ‘revolutionary economic project’ assumed in the 
propaganda of the regime, the “Fascist corporations” as representatives of economic 
categories of different trade and industrial sectors never became strategic centres of the 
national economy, and the debate they spurred was seldom of any relevance in practice. 
Their activity was mostly of a consultative nature, while the issuing of rules regulating 
economic activities in different sectors - the real ‘revolutionary’ issue - was very limited 
(Cassese, 1974; Franck, 1990; Aquarone, 2003: pp. 193 and ff.). Fascist corporations 
allowed social conflict to be appeased in a context of internal and international economic 
difficulties, while the real centres of power were elsewhere in banking and industry. They 
were especially located in the State owned firms, the most effective instruments of the 
Italian Fascist State’s interventionist economic policy. IMI (Istituto Mobiliare Italiano) 
was founded in 1931 for the purpose of relieving the banking system of the pressure that 
arose from the large demand for loans from enterprises, by granting them long-term loans. 
This action was, however, insufficient and the situation of the banks that also owned 
shares in firms deteriorated until 1933, when IRI (Istituto della Ricostruzione Industriale) 
was instituted in order to cut the ties between banks and industry. IRI bought the shares 
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from the banks with the intention of giving them back to the private entrepreneurs after 
restructuring the firms. Instead, in 1937 IRI became a permanent institute with the 
objective of assuming additional participation in great industrial firms involved in 
national defence, autarky and the valorisation of the (Fascist) Empire. 
In the end, the “corporative” economic system in action proved to be primarily 
bureaucratic in its nature and effects; the actions carried out by Fascist corporations 
(drainage in certain parts of Italy, settlement of disputes between manufacturers, rationing 
control and retail prices, bank control, mandatory unions) were neither particularly 
original, nor effective. 
Nevertheless, the development of corporative economy and fascist ideology did not keep 
accounting and business studies free from influence. Several scholars tackled general 
corporative economic issues and the relationship with business economic disciplines. The 
subject of “Corporative economics” was a recurring topic in the Italian Accounting 
Review (IAR) and in other publications of the ‘30s (Cinquini, 2007).  
Among the recurrent themes, the ‘problem of costs’ and ‘standards’ was considered 
central to the development of an economic policy for the planning and statutory 
requirements gradually established (credit sector, import/export, taxation, prices) 
(Donnini, 1938; Santarelli, 1938a and 1938b; Trovati, 1938).  
It is also worthwhile noticing that significant academic contributions to the debate on 
costing were produced in the Thirties in Italy. Although the accounting history research 
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in Italy has been largely focused on the development and heritage of Zappa’s thought, 
namely on the revolution of ‘income-based accounting system’ and the establishment of 
Economia aziendale4 (Canziani, 1994; Galassi, 2002; Antinori, 2003: pp. 43 ff.), in this 
period works on cost issues  - that would later prove to be essential references in Italy 
after the Second World War - were published (Viganò and Mattesich, 2007). Publications 
of Italian scholars such as Pacces (1934), D’Ippolito (1935), Giannessi (1935 and 1943), 
De Minico (1935), Ceccherelli (1936), Amodeo (1941), all dealt with such issues from 
different perspectives5.  
The gradual increase in size of manufacturing firms in the Italian economy also affected 
and spurred developments in the literature, due to the new control issues that were being 
introduced. Furthermore, the war economy stressed the significance of cost related to the 
perspectives of economic planning and regulation, as it was experienced by the 
development of unified accounting in Germany (Amaduzzi, 1943). After the entering of 
Italy into WWII (June, 10th, 1940) the quest for setting uniform accounting rules became 
unequivocally urgent in the Italian fascist government agenda. Thus, cost accounting 
standardization became a way to contribute to the institutionalization of the Fascist 
regime power (Kearins and Hooper, 2002).  
The next section explains the reasons of the establishment of the Commission by the 
Fascist Government and the importance that the longstanding experience of the German 
ally played in the development of its work. 
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The role played by the Fascist Government and the German ally  
 
In a meeting held on November 29, 1941, the Council of Ministers of Fascist Government 
entrusted the Ministry of Corporations (Ministero delle corporazioni) with the issue of 
setting the rules to unify accounting and costing practices in the Italian industry. On behalf 
of the Ministry of Corporations (Minister Renato Ricci), the Confederation of Industrials 
founded a central organ called “Central Commission for accounting unification”, also 
named Uniconti.  
The reason for the introduction of a uniform accounting system is expressed in a letter, 
dated December 29, 1941, sent by the Minister of Corporations to the Ministry of Finance, 
the President of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Justice and the Fascist Party 
National Directorate. In this letter, the need for a measure by which the Ministry of 
Corporations could have the power to issue “provisions for the unification of accounting 
systems” is mentioned, together with the reference to the German experience: 
 
“… such a measure responds to the requirement for simpler tools to control production 
costs, in order to better regulate maximum selling prices. The concrete provisions that 
will be issued for this purpose are currently being prepared by taking into account the 
results achieved with the German experience. In particular, the aim of these principles, 
in addition to simplifying production cost control in order to fix better selling prices, 
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is to provide appropriate comparison to determine the costs incurred by the same 
enterprise in different time periods and the costs incurred by other companies of the 
same industry sector over the same time period. Through a technical and 
administrative rationalization of manufacturing and trade businesses, and by keeping 
analytical records of each individual production cost item, production processes may 
also be controlled in order to evaluate their economic convenience” (LET., Ricci, 
December 29, 1941, pp. 1-2). 
 
The intentions of the Minister of Corporations highlight the general purposes of the 
initiative: to control enterprises, within the framework of a corporative economic policy, 
without any explicit reference to the war economy, but rather emulating Germany 
practices. Since the beginning, Germany is addressed as the experience to consider for 
the Italian initiative. 
Looking at the documents related to the establishment of the Commission, the 
correspondence between the Minister of Corporations and the Minister of Justice (Achille 
Grandi) shows different interpretations as to the role of the State in the economy of the 
corporative system (Santomassimo, 2006). Minister Grandi emphasises the fact that the 
provision was intended to limit the “regulation of maximum sale prices”, therefore having 
a temporary “objective closely connected with the specific conditions of the war period” 
(LET., Grandi, January 10, 1942). The Minister of Corporations on the contrary suggests 
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a much more ambitious objective of “controlling production processes in view of 
economic convenience” that may be supported by the accounting unification (LET., 
Ricci, December 29, 1941). 
After its establishment, in a letter dated January 12, 1942 sent to Renato Ricci (Minister 
of Corporations) to submitt its work plan, the Commission stated its intention to follow 
the method already used in Germany, as its consolidated experience since 1937. The 
German legislation on accounting unification was also discussed in several letters 
exchanged between the Commission and the Minister of Corporations. In a letter dated 
June 1942, probably sent by the secretary of the Commission (Guido Carli) to the Minister 
of Corporations, we read: 
 
“…I also considered the option of sharing the main rules issued in Germany in this 
field, so that the Ministry’s technicians may examine the project by taking into account 
the German experience. In this respect, I think that a direct contact between the office 
of the Ministry and the offices of the Confederation responsible for the study of 
business accounting issues is desirable. A joint debate could bring about improvements 
to the project” (LET., Carli, June 1942, p. 1). 
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The relevance of the influence of the German experience in the work of the Uniconti 
Commission is supported by the presence of three additional documents in the archive 
folder on which this research is grounded.  
The first bears the title “Position of accounting in the framework of the German 
rationalization movement” (without author nor date) and consists of a long introduction 
to the accounting unification process carried out in Germany to reorganise the industry in 
view of achieving the highest possible manufacturing efficiency level in enterprises. This 
document covers the fundamental stages of this process.  
The second document, called “First report to the Minister of Corporations on the 
unification of accounting in Germany” (without author nor date), details the criteria 
followed by the Reich to identify a unified scheme for cost accounting. Guido Carli might 
have written the document, since pieces of its contents can be found in an article (Carli, 
1941). 
The third document, “Use of the depreciations of industrial companies for financing the 
war”, dated January 28, 1942, is the translation of the “NeueZürcherZeitung” of January 
21, 1941, where the proposal on depreciation developed in Germany by the Vienna 
economist Nöll v.d. Nahmer (published by the journal “Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft” 
of December 1, 1941) is discussed.  
Contacts between Germany and Italy on these issues closely connected with the work of 
the Commission were intensified, so that the Reichsgruppe Industrie and the Fascist 
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Confederation of Industrials held a conference in Rome on May 26 and 27, 1942. During 
this meeting, the representatives of the two organisations exchanged views, particularly 
about price determination and control in the manufacturing industry.  
The President of Reichsgruppe Industrie, Zangen, illustrated the economic pricing policy 
implemented by Germany in detail: the Reichsgruppe Industry worked as a consultant for 
the Price Commission in every circumstance - he stated - and industry was involved in all 
the issues that regarded prices (DOC., “Minutes of the second meeting held by the Fascist 
Confederation of Industrialists”, May 26, 1942). This contrasted with the strictly 
hierarchical price determination and control method used in Italy so far. The former-
Finance Minister and President of the Confederation of Industrials, Giuseppe Volpi, also 
took the floor at the conclusion of the meeting and expressed the following considerations 
about the Italian system based on the German colleague’s views: 
 
“I believe that this system [in Italy] cannot be used in the long-term and needs to be 
reviewed” (DOC., “Minutes of the second meeting held by the Fascist Confederation 
of Industrialists”, May 26, 1942, p. 14). 
 
What appears from these sources is that the aims given to the Italian uniform accounting 
and costing systems were multiple in the minds of the governmental actors that lead the 
process. Althought the Uniconti Commission was primarily promoted by the Italian 
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Government for reasons related to the wartime need of control on job prices, part of the 
leaders of the Fascist regime considered uniform costing as a fundamental accounting 
device for implementing a new interventionist economic policy. This initiative was seen 
indeed as the possibility of a “further step forward” toward the making of the ‘fascist 
corporative economy’. The pressure by Government to embed these objectives into 
operative statutory rules represents one relevant element to analyze the power relations 
among the actors involved into Commission’s activity (Kearins and Hooper, 2002). 
Another point is that Germany was considered as the main reference for the 
Commission’s work since the beginning of the initiative. This circumstance is certainly 
related to the ideological and political alliance between the nazist and the fascist regimes 
at the time. Beside this, it is a matter of fact that when Italy faced the price control issues 
of the war economy together with the problem of standardising accounting practices, the 
German ally already had a long-term experience that represented an important reference.  
In fact, the German economic system at the beginning of the Second World War had 
experienced significantly advanced uniform accounting processes, both in financial 
reporting and costing. They were realized through an elaboration started since 1914-1915 
in a well prepared context (Carli, 1941), as the result of a co-operation between companies 
and private groups, institutions and universities long before the rise to power of Nazism. 
Afterwards, a further development was impressed by the nazi centralized economic policy 
(Frei, 2002): uniform accounting, which had been a voluntary choice until then, became 
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mandatory within the context of the controlled National Socialist economy and a tool of 
its economic policy (Matz, 1940a; 1940b).  
In Italy, on the contrary, no statutory requirements were developed for accounting in the 
Thirties, a definitely different situation than in Germany. Companies had extensive 
freedom to select their preferred criteria, accounting methods, charts of accounts, costing 
methods, financial reporting forms, according to the principles that seemed to them to be 
the most appropriate for their organisation and for the purposes of each individual 
enterprise (Fabrizi, 1942: pp. 1-2).  
The reason of the different development of uniform accounting between Italy and 
Germany is twofold. A first reason can be addressed in the different types of economic 
policy and regulation mechanisms that prevailed in the two countries. In Italy, as 
aforementioned, the direct intervention by the State in certain sectors of the economy was 
realized through State-owned companies (such as IMI and IRI), differently from Nazist 
Germany, and this implied the development of specific regulatory and governmental 
tools. The issue of cost standardization was more urgent in Germany due to the need of 
regulating prices and eliminating extra-profit in large private monopolistic companies, 
while in Italy these companies had become State owned and played a pivotal role in the 
industrial development in the Thirties (Carli, 1941: p. 6). A secondary reason is related 
to a general suspicion of the Italian academy toward the  excess in regulation of business 
activities6, even in the ideological prominence of Fascist ideology. 
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These were the reasons of the different stage of development of uniform accounting 
between Italy and Germany. The position of Italy appeared backward with respect to 
Germany in this field as evidenced by the reports of the conference held in Rome in 1942, 
according with the different paths toward standardization followed by the two countries 
and the differences in price determination and control in the manufacturing industry. 
Hence, another point emerges affecting power relations according to Foucault (1982), 
namely the system of differentiations (Kearins and Hooper, 2002). In the case of 
“Uniconti” Commission there were relevant differences between Italy and Germany 
(economic and cultural) and this was a premise to the dialectic among these actors 
involved in the Commission activity. 
 
The role played by business representatives and academics  
 
The members of the Uniconti Commission were academicians in accounting and 
Economia aziendale, chartered accountants and managers of manufacturing companies7. 
There is no evidence in the source documents about the criteria followed for the selection 
of the academics and the chartered accountants in the Commission. The origin of the 
accounting profession in Italy can be located in the first decades of the XX century, in a 
period in which the Italian industrial revolution was completed, business studies had a 
further progress and Higher Schools of Commerce had a considerable diffusion. 
Nevertheless, only a decree of 1929 determined the origin of the actual Order of chartered 
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accountant profession (Camodeca, 2005). From the documents collected it seems that the 
involvement and the contribution of the accounting profession in the Uniconti 
Commission were not relevant. The accounting profession in Italy had been formally 
established not so far before the establishment of the Commission, and therefore it did 
not have a recognized institutionalization and influence in the domain of the 
standardization of accounting principles promoted by the Government. 
The role played by the representatives of the Italian academy in the Commission8 in the 
making of these accounting rules is clear since the first meeting, when principles and 
times of conducting the work were defined. 
We read in the minutes of the first meeting a speech pronounced by Prof. Onida, who was 
the chairperson of the meeting and had the task of planning the work: 
 
“…In the end, Prof. Onida summarised the discussion as follows: 
(a) We have the problem of trying to standardise administration practices (financial 
accounting, cost accounting, and connections between the two); 
(b) We have the problem of trying to standardise cost recognition criteria. There are as 
many cost configurations as purposes. For example, the costs arising from financial 
accounting - in which the costs incurred for the achievement of a certain product 
contrast the revenues achieved with the sale of the same product- do not provide 
indication for the purposes of pricing policy; for these purposes we will have to assume 
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the cost as determined on the basis, for example, of materials evaluated not at the 
purchase price but at the repurchase price” (MIN., first meeting, December 13, 1941, 
p. 2). 
 
In other occasions, the curiosity of the researcher seems to mix the necessary pragmatism 
drawn from the situation. In the fourth meeting of the Commission, attended also by some 
iron and steel industries, an issue raised which stirred Prof. D’Ippolito’s interest, i.e. the 
link between financial and cost accounting: 
 
“Prof. D’Ippolito took the floor and pointed out that it was time for attendees to express 
their opinions about methods to connect financial and cost accounting practices. Since 
such a connection could strongly affect the structure of financial accounting, it would 
be impossible for the Central Commission to formulate broad principles of financial 
accounting unification without having clarified this aspect first” (MIN., fourth 
meeting, January 15, 1942, p. 5). 
 
Finally, the commitment of academicians in the creation of a common technical language 
to be shared by all the participants appears evident: 
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“While a study will be carried out on each individual sector of the industry, the Central 
Commission will select uniform cost accounting criteria. For this purpose, professors 
D’Ippolito, Onida and Pacces have been invited to draw up a terminology unification 
draft” (MIN., third meeting, December 23, 1941, p. 6). 
 
The acknowledgement of the role of academicians emerges also at the end of the eleventh 
meeting of the Commission, where the guidelines for the work of Sub-Commissions were 
traced. A university professor member of the Central Commission was entrusted with the 
role of chairing the Sub-Commissions (MIN., eleventh meeting, May 1, 1942, p. 1), thus 
contributing to add consistency to the scientific foundation of the solutions proposed. In 
sum, the Italian accounting academic community offered a scientific contribution on the 
relevant accounting themes  of the Commission, as we will discuss widely in the 
following section.  
Concerning the role of business representatives, it is noteworthy a difference between the 
attitude of German and Italian entrepeneurs toward the accounting standardization 
initiative.  
German manufacturers’ associations played a significant protagonist role in the 
development of uniform accounting schemes far before the advent of the Nazi regime, 
particularly in the steel and machinery industries9. According to the considerations of the 
president of the German manufacturers’ associations, Zangen, presented during the 
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already mentioned meeting held between the German manufactures and the 
Confederazione dell’Industria (hereinafter: Confindustria) on May 26-27, 1942: 
 
“ (…) in cost control and pricing, we are proud to be able to say that we have achieved 
a significant success, particularly due to the pre-existing control organization and to 
the manufacturers’ self-discipline. (DOC., “Minutes of the second meeting held at the 
Fascist Confederation of Industrialists”, May 26, 1942, p. 1) 
On the contrary, Italian Confindustria did not appeared fully convinced about the aims of 
the initiative of the Uniconti Commission. It was perceived as potentially dangerous, both 
in the control exercised by the State on the businesses’ management boards and in the 
practical enforcement of the new principles. In this respect the industrial organizations 
were feared that it could be applied with the aim of increasing the tax area.  
Aware of this feeling, since the first meeting held on December 13, 1941 Giovanni 
Balella, General Director of Confindustria, during his introductory speech invited the 
Commission, “… to develop a unification program, without being distracted during the 
development of the work regarding the objectives that unification should fulfil in the 
Ministry’s mind”. The concern we read in these words also echoes in other minutes of 
meetings held by working groups and representatives of the businesses. 
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The meeting minutes reveal the frequent criticism and concerns expressed by the 
representatives of Italian enterprises about the fiscal implications of accounting 
unification.  
A first issue was the fear that the tax burden could increase, looking to what had happened 
with the accounting unification process in the war period, as the German experience had 
showed: 
 
“… from the components referred to the manufacturing industry (Ghezzi, Ghiglione 
and Teani), we have serious concerns for the possible tax implications of unification” 
(MIN., first meeting, December 13, 1941, p. 2). 
“During the debate, the representatives of the hydroelectric companies expressed their 
concern about the tax implications that may result from unification” (MIN., second 
meeting, December 22, 1941, p. 2). 
 
“The attitude of Sub-Commissions in respect of the unification movement is largely 
influenced by the tax concern” (DOC., “Note for the Director”, November 9, 1942, p. 
5). 
 
A second set of worries of the industrial representatives was strictly operational in nature, 
but in the Commission’s opinion it would have heavily affected the implementation of a 
 28 
unified accounting system. These problems were highlighted in a note for the director of 
the Confederation, dated November 9, 1942 (when the work was almost completed):  
 
“Most reports delivered so far describe the enormous technical difficulties companies 
would face in the event that unified accounting schemes were enforced immediately, 
and this for two reasons: a) lack of administrative staff, determined by the current war 
contingencies; b) lack of qualification for most small and medium size companies 
(whose accounting systems are rather rudimentary) to apply the unified schemes” 
(DOC., “Note for the Director”, November 9, 1942, pp. 5-6). 
 
The worries of the industrial representatives about the tax implications and the difficulties 
affecting the implementation of a unified accounting system relate to the objective of 
firms to preserve profitability. This objective contrasts with those of Government and 
represents a further element useful to explain power relations (Focault, 1982) and to 
understand why the unified accounting system was settled in the way  explained in the 
next section.  
Furthermore, according with the Fascism historiography, another circumstance that is 
important about the role of entrepeneurs’ representatives in the Uniconti Commission is 
that Confindustria substantially acted as an operating instrument used by the Ministry of 
Corporations to govern the economy during the Fascist era (Rossi, 1966; Santomassimo, 
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2006). In fact, since the so-called ‘Palazzo Vidoni Pact’ with Fascism in 192510 
Confindustria became an institution “enjoying both the independence of a private 
organization and the power of a public institution” (Sarti, 1971: p. 14). Confindustria was 
entrusted with the daily management and direction of the entire economic mechanism, 
and its technical offices became a sort of operational staff of the Fascist corporations. In 
the case of Uniconti Commission experience, it is understandable that the Fascist 
Government considered the cooperating role of industrial organizations crucial for the 
implementation of a uniform accounting plan useful for the economic policy - as the 
German experience had widely demonstrated. Nevertheless, the evidence of the work in 
the Uniconti Commission shows how the commitment of industrials in the attempt of 
developing accounting standardization in the Italian context was problematic.In Italy the 
issue of accounting standardization had not been developed gradually as in Germany, and 
the entrepeneurs remained suspiciuos toward the State intervention. We can also perceive 
by the evidence the limited penetration of the ‘corporative ideology’ in the capitalistic 
class in Italy at that time, although it was supporting the Fascist regime (Rossi, 1966). 
Hence, Confidustria can be considered for the Fascist regime as a way of bringing power 
relations into being (Focault, 1982), even if the mindset of Italian capitalistic class made 
it more difficult than in Germany and required a different approach. 
 
The outcomes of the Commission: cost accounting rules between 
economic rationality and State-intervention ideology  
 30 
 
In the previous sections, the main expectations from Government and Business 
representatives addressed toward the uniform cost system and the cultural and economic 
differences between Germany and Italy have been discussed.  
The evidence shows that the purpose of the Government for the uniform costing system 
adoption was twofold (LET., Ricci, December 29, 1941, pp. 1-2; LET., Grandi, January 
10, 1942). From one side, it was considered as a tool for controlling enterprises within 
the framework of a corporative economic policy. In this view it was a “mechanism” useful 
for implementing ideological constructs and political targets in the real world. From 
another side, the Goverment was interested to control war expenses and to reduce as much 
as possible inflation. In this perspective, the uniform costing system had a more 
contingent role.  
Business representatives appear more as counterpart than as allies or partners of the 
Government. They wished to fix cost accounting rules for economic reasons, since they 
tried to maintain/increase the profitability of the firms (see, for example the fears by the 
industrials toward the tax burden, above mentioned). 
Academicians in accounting and Economia aziendale had to manage their position within 
the match between these two parties remaining consistent with their doctrinal 
background. Furthermore, as documented, the process of cost accounting rules 
formulation was influenced by the German experience, even though there were some 
relevant differences between the allies. How did the German experience and the 
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differences in the objectives of each actor involved in the Commission’s work affect the 
cost accounting rules proposed by the Commission?  
In order to provide an answer, the two documents produced by the Commission and the 
process behind these documents are examined in this section. To facilitate the 
interpretation of the primary sources, we will use also as a secondary source an article 
published at that time (De Minico and D’Ippolito, 1943), whose purpose was just to 
analyze certain subjects related to the Commission’s work. This article is dated 
September 1942 (published in 1943) and one author (Teodoro D’Ippolito) was a member 
of the Uniconti Commission. 
Sources are examined considering the following issues: 
- the cost accounting principles; 
- the cost accounting system; 
- the depreciation rules; 
 
- the relationship between product costs and prices. 
 
The cost accounting principles  
The guidelines for calculating product costs are included in the document entitled “Criteri 
per la determinazione dei costi come base per la fissazione dei prezzi dei prodotti nelle 
vendite da parte dell’industria” [Costing principles to be used as a basis for fixing the 
prices of products to be sold by the industry, hereinafter: “Costing principles”]. The parts 
of the document useful to be analysed to explain the match among different forces 
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involved in the costing system design may concern: cost objects, purposes of the costing 
systems, allocation methods.  
For each of these topics the main points are recalled and discussed to point out if and why 
actors involved in the costing system design may have exerted pressure toward certain 
solutions. 
Reading the “Costing principles”, it emerges that usually specific products are considered 
as cost objects, eventually group of products or product lines (e.g. in the case of joint 
products); sometimes also activities enclosed in the production process may be a cost 
object (“Costing principles”, p. 3; De Minico and D’Ippolito, 1943: p. 66). Evidence 
showing different views of the parties involved in the design of the costing system were 
not found about the cost objects. 
The document specifies that cost determination has the main purpose of obtaining a basis 
for fixing prices by a mark-up that may allow a profit to the organization to be 
economically self-sufficient (Costing principles: p. 3). In other words, prices should allow 
an organisation to be “wisely administrated” over a length of time with no economic help 
from outside, i.e. having the necessary financial resources to face changing market 
conditions. For this purpose, repurchase or reconstruction values are admitted in costing 
practices, whenever required. This cost accounting rule is extremely conservative, both 
for the profitability of firms’ owners and for the autonomy of economic system. 
Therefore, this solution met the needs of the Business representatives and the 
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Government. From a theoretical perspective it could be controversial, as it does not reflect 
the actual costs incurred by companies to carry out the production processes. Resources 
for replacing investment may be obtained by provisions and in a market economy funding 
to repurchase the inputs could derive from the owners and/or from banks, if the company 
is profitable. However, in the documents examined, there is not evidence of unfavorable 
comments from the academicians, probably because the solution adopted allowed the 
survival of business, it was viable to the corporative economy and more feasible with 
respect to other ways for replacing investments. Hence, it may have been considered as a 
“good compromise” for the actors partecipating to the activities of the Commission.   
The costing system proposed faced the problem of cost allocation. The basic principle 
underlying cost allocation accepted by the Commission was the cause-and-effect 
principle (De Minico and D’Ippolito, 1943: pp. 66-67). According to De Minico and 
D’Ippolito’s (1943) interpretation, wherever the cause-and-effect principle is not 
applicable, the Commission indicated as a reference the contribution capacity principle 
(which established that shares of indirect costs are allocated to the products according to 
their assumed “facility and rapidity of placement in the market”). As regard the cost 
allocation criteria the document highlights that no absolute criterion may be suggested: 
 
“It should be recognised that no absolute criterion can be indicated for the allocation 
of common costs. Therefore, different allocation criteria must necessarily be figured 
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out, provided that the sum of the shares allocated equals the total amount of (indirectly 
allocated) common costs that can be referred to the whole productions of the business 
over the time period considered. It is understood that, once a given common cost 
allocation criterion for the determination of the total cost of a given product has been 
accepted, this criterion shall constantly be applied for that product, even when the total 
cost of the other products has to be determined.” (DOC., “Costing principles”, 1942, 
pp. 3-4). 
 
This piece of document recalls one aspect of Gino Zappa’s thought. In Zappa’s view 
(1937: p. 232 and the following), allocating margins (and consequently the respective 
revenues and costs) to the corresponding specific productions was the result of an 
abstraction, and also, in a way, of an excessive forcing of reality. In fact, as He points out, 
costs and revenues are interwined each other in space and time, so that their separation 
has to be operated with extreme caution and, in any case, without neglecting their 
interdependence. In this respect, the clarification on the costs assignment (both direct and 
indirect) reported in the document may be interpreted as the acceptance of a theoretical 
contribution from the academicians operating inside the Commission11.  
Moreover, the quote above proves that there was a need to establish shared criteria for 
costing practices that State control authorities might assess (LET., Balella, February 19, 
1942). Hence the maintenance over time of the cost allocation criteria facilitated 
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verification and comparability of the data from the government, this could be useful to 
facilitate the functioning of the corporative economy. Therefore, it is plausible to assume 
that the criteria for the allocation of costs above reported have been accepted by the fascist 
Government as they were aligned with its political targets. 
 
 The cost accounting system 
The document entitled “Ordinamento della contabilità generale e delle determinazioni dei 
costi nelle aziende delle industrie siderurgica e metallurgica” [General accounting and 
costing regulations applicable to the iron and steel industry, hereinafter: “Iron and steel 
industry cost regulation”] is the only detailed document available in the archive that was 
developed taking into account the previous general guidelines. The document bears no 
date. It was found in the historical archive of Confindustria together with the other records 
concerning the Commission, and its contents is in line with the main document 
concerning unified cost accounting by the same Commission. Therefore we believe that 
it may have been drawn up during 1942 – i.e. the year in which the Commission produced 
its main results. 
 As regards product costs, information is obtained according to the scheme presented in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 – Unified scheme of the product cost configuration for the organisations of the Iron 
and Steel Industry (source: DOC., “Iron and steel industry cost regulation”: p. 14) 
 
Based on the recommendations developed in the document, estimated costs should be 
performed according to the unified scheme described above for current costs. These costs 
would provide the basis for the determination of the prices to be set by companies in the 
Iron and Steel Industry. In the document it is recognized that costs must be used to set 
prices, so that a company may generally establish a suitable connection between costs 
and revenues to ensure long term survival of the business. 
Total product cost
(so- called 
“economic-technical cost”)
Full  product cost (1)
Direct costs
Shares of
Indirect costs
a1) Raw materials and
semi-finished products
a2) Combustible and other 
materials for the production 
process
b) Labor
c) Other items
d1) Direct and support-
service departments
d2) Common and other 
industrial departments
e) Sales and general 
administrative departments
f) Development department
g) Interests on invested capital
h) Other figurative costs (if any);
i) Charges that can be directly deducted from gross sales proceeds
l) Share of general tax load
1) It doesn’t include f inancial interests and income and property taxes
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The first reference to determine the amount of costs for each item is given by that existing 
at the time of estimation (“Iron and steel industry cost regulation”: p. 30). But if the 
company can reasonably assume that costs will change in the future, then it may adopt 
estimated costs (as suggested in the “Costing principles” document).  
The department (or cost centre) is the “elementary unit” considered to forecast indirect 
costs (“Iron and steel industry cost regulation”: p. 32). It is worth to underline that also 
the German experience concerning the unification of cost accounting practices, was 
grounded on a “cost center-based-costing”. Cost centers were used together with multiple 
overhead rates (as described widely in the DOC. “First report to the Minister of 
Corporations on the unification of accounting in Germany”, n.d., p. 2). These similarities 
with German unified scheme may be a further element highlighting the influence exerted 
by the German experience.  
Finally, the so-called “economic-technical cost” is obtained summing up the interest on 
invested capital, charges that can be directly deducted from gross sales proceeds and a 
“remuneration for the general economic business risk” (which is not explicitly indicated 
in Figure 1). The latter is determined by considering the future operating conditions of 
the organisation, according to its past experience and, again, by taking into account future 
economic perspectives (“Iron and steel industry cost regulation”: pp. 31-32)12. The 
scheme includes a compensation for the owners; therefore it is possible to assume that it 
has been accepted from the Business representatives and the Government. In effect this 
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scheme guaranteed a profit to the firms’ owners and at the same time permitted to control 
the pricing of enterprises. This last aspect was relevant in order to have a costing system 
operating as a mechanism useful to realize a corporative economic policy. 
 
 
The depreciation rules  
 
As reported above depreciation may be a critical issue in the economy of war (see the 
document, “Use of the depreciations of industrial companies for financing the war”, 
quoted above) because from one side it has an implication to the financing of war 
expenses, on the other side this conflicts with the interests of the firms’owners. But also 
from a technical point of view depreciation may be a critical point in designing uniform 
costing systems, because it is necessary to set shared and verifiable rules.  
In the document “Costing principles” depreciation is distinguished according to different 
purposes (tax assessment, balance sheet and product cost). This distinction seems to be a 
first answer to the suspicions of managers and owners concerning the tax implications 
coming from the uniform costing system. 
The sources examined include several parts useful to understand how the accounting rules 
concerning depreciation may be interpreted in the light of the influence of the actors 
involved.  
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The importance attributed to the repurchase or reconstruction values to calculate 
depreciation is underlined in the minute of a meeting reporting the quote of a steel and 
iron company representative: 
 
“(…) We will begin by unifying general accounting principles, and then pass to 
unifying cost accounting practices. Moreover, we shall discuss costing criteria. In this 
regard, Dr. Bellorini [Finsider Company] took the floor and expressed his vote, also 
on account of the iron and steel organisations not belonging to his group, that 
Confindustria should support the industrialists’ point of view according to which 
depreciation should be mainly related not with plant current values of construction, 
but rather with plant re-construction values, keeping into account the currency 
depreciation value. In addition, interest on invested capital shall be related to the 
capital resulting from the revaluation of the company’s business expressed in current 
currency value” (MIN., fourth meeting, January 15, 1942, p. 4). 
 
The document on Iron and Steel industry accepted this observation: it asserts that in 
current cost calculation, depreciation usually is determined by making reference to the 
historical recording values, adjusted to keep into consideration any change in the currency 
purchasing power, if necessary. Regarding the estimated costs it seems possible to 
consider reconstruction or repurchase value, because the document affirms that future 
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product prices (determined considering the production costs) have to permit to restore the 
assets used in the production process. Hence for this point the other members of the 
Commission shared the industrialists’ point of view. 
Another aspect concerns the incidence of the depreciation on the cost objects. 
Depreciation is a typical fixed cost, if the production volume change the incidence of this 
cost item on the unit product cost will change in an inversely proportional manner. The 
document on iron and steel industry allows current product costs to be determined fixing 
a “normal amount” of fixed cost, wherever production undergoes considerable 
fluctuations (“Iron and steel industry cost regulation”: p. 25). A “normal production level” 
rather than the actual one determines the “normal amount” of fixed costs. This rule makes 
possible to stabilize the incidence of fixed costs onto product costs. Over allocations 
(current volume higher than normal) are compensated with under allocations (current 
volume lower than normal). Due to the stabilized incidence of fixed costs on units there 
is not price fluctuation depending on the reduction/increase of production volume. This 
could be a useful result for the Government in the wartime, when the trend of prices tends 
to increase inflation and war expenses. Moreover, companies could recover the cost 
incurred through the compensation mechanism. Thus, both the objective of the owners 
(economic interests) and that of the Government found a satisfying combination in this 
technical solution. 
 
The relationship between product costs and prices  
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The uniform costing system proposed by the Commission had to support price setting. It 
is useful to analyze how costs have been connected to the prices and how the actors 
involved in that context influenced the adopted solutions. 
The additional profit to product cost in order to obtain price may be considered as the 
“bridge” between product costs and prices. This amount is enclosed into the unified 
scheme (Figure 1) through the determination of the so-called economic-technical-cost as 
adopted by the Commission. According to the “Iron and steel industry cost regulation” 
(pp. 31-32) the profit enclosed into the economic-technical cost is determined by adding 
two components: the interest on invested capital and the remuneration for the general 
economic business risk. Interest on invested capital is obtained by multiplying the book 
value of the entire capital invested (recorded on the assets side and updated, if necessary, 
to keep into account the currency’s loss of purchase power). The invested capital is 
determined taking into account the monetary depreciation, as a firm representative asked 
during a meeting of the Commission (above quoted), so that economic interests of the 
owners are preserved. 
The rate to be applied to this capital is assumed identical to the rate determined “by the 
bank cartel for unsecured current account overdraft, inclusive of banking fees and 
charges” (“Iron and steel industry cost regulation”: p. 26). No recommendation is given 
both on the share of interests between owners and other financing parties and on the 
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calculation of the remuneration for the general economic business risk. This is just the 
amount of profit that, from a “technical point of view”, should be used as a basis for 
setting prices. In defining this amount of profit there is space for adjustments due to the 
pressures of the parties involved in the Commission. For instance, how the weight for the 
general business risk should be set? This is a potential source of conflict between the State 
and the Business representatives (the first had the interest to reduce this weight, the 
second to increase it). Unfortunately there is no evidence on the discussion among the 
parties on this point. The only element that the Commission points out is that the product 
costs determined according to the unified scheme provide a basis for the determination of 
the prices to be adopted by the companies in the Iron and Steel Industry (DOC., “General 
accounting and costing regulations applicable to the iron and steel industry”, n.d., p. 30). 
The fact that the product costs plus the compensation for the owners is addressed as the 
base for fixing prices and not the price to apply, gives space for some considerations.  
The first one is that the profitability rises from a comparison between the convenience of 
all the product prices adopted in a firm with all the product costs incurred, rather than 
from the tight correspondence one to one between single production costs (as determined 
according with the rules described before) and single price. This approach is aligned with 
Zappa’s theoretical unitary view of the firm and reveals an influence from academia on 
the use of cost accounting information in orienting the price setting process.  
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The second consideration concerns the elasticity in the connections between costs and 
prices, i.e. the maintainance of a range of possible acceptable solutions. This issue 
permits to integrate the objectives coming from corporative ideology and war economy 
government needs with those coming from the other actors involved in setting cost 
accounting rules. For the discussion of this point it is useful to report a concept that was 
explained in an article by De Minico and D’Ippolito (1943). 
De Minico and D’Ippolito (1943: p. 63 and ff.) claimed that the degree of fullfilment of 
the needs of individuals and interest groups in a corporative regime aimed to obtain a 
“maximum distribution fairness in a maximum collective creation”. The first goal was 
referred to a less arbitrary and “as fair as possible” redistribution of the wealth produced, 
while the second addressed the best possible use to be made of human forces and of 
resources available. 
As to distribution fairness, unjustified over-profit was not admissible, where over-profits 
were those not obtained for an “exceptional efficiency improvement activity”13. When 
over-profits were justified, they were considered as a significant incentive for business to 
improve its production conditions. However, such incentives are not a permanent rule, 
but should have lasted until an “ethical-corporative awareness” would be developed as a 
shared ideology in the economic system.  
Thus, taking into account product cost information, prices may be selected in order to get 
superior aims such as the “maximum distribution fairness in a maximum collective 
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creation” (or for facing urgent needs linked to the war). In other words, in order to get 
superior aims, it is possible for any given product to fix a price different from the product 
cost-plus the profit determined according to the unified system. This leads us to consider 
at least the following alternatives (Jucius, 1944: p. 43): 
- the use of the price of the marginal business; 
- the adoption of a single price defined by making reference to a specified business, 
selected according to predefined criteria; 
- the use of a single average price for any given product. 
The choice among these three may be influenced by ideological and political reasons. 
If the target would be to use the entire productive capacity available (e.g. in the war time) 
the price for the same product realized by different companies, should be established 
according to the marginal business, i.e. the price of the less efficient company.  
Vice versa, the target could be efficiency over a given historical period: in this case a low 
price of a company representing a sort of reference (benchmark) should be identified in 
order to improve the productivity of the system in the medium-long term. 
Instead, if an average price is set, this means that a mix of the previous objectives is 
pursued. In each of the alternatives, the most efficient businesses realize profit levels 
greater than expected and this effect satisfies the ideological concept of “maximum 
distribution fairness” as highlighted by De Minico and D’Ippolito (1943). 
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The Commission did not face the problem, however it was a question surrounding the the 
use of uniform cost system, as it emerges from the following quote: 
 
“The only possible solution seems to be determining a single sale price referred to the 
production cost of the marginal business. (...) This will necessarily determine revenues 
for the businesses located on the positive side of the margin – moreover, such a 
phenomenon is susceptible of producing useful economic effects, as it provides the 
strongest possible incentive to improve production processes. This is the view adopted 
in Germany to replace the old approach, also for the purpose of determining the price 
of government procurement. As it is well known, according to the provisions contained 
in the fundamental legislation in this field, the prices of government procurement 
contracts are proportional to the production costs of individual suppliers, so that as 
many prices as suppliers would be fixed. (…). This would have the purpose of forcing 
less efficient manufacturers to improve their production processes (...)” (DOC., 
“Observations on production cost to be considered for price setting”, n.d., pp. 1-3) 
 
Given the basic economic principles that must be respected to allow the companies to 
survive, in cost accounting it is well known the possibility to make “different costs for 
different purposes” and the evidence proposed sheds some light on the rationale that was 
behind the exercise of power by the actors involved both in the design and use of cost 
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accounting rules. The discussion we have provided on the cost accounting issues faced 
by the Uniconti Commission explores how power relations (ideological, political, 
economic and academic) affected these purposes and influenced the design of cost 
accounting rules. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
In describing and analysing the experience of the Uniconti Commission in Fascist Italy, 
we emphasized the relationship between accounting and its organizational, social and 
political content (Burchell et al., 1980; Hopwood, 1983; Previts et al., 1990b; Carnegie 
and Napier, 1996, 2012).  
This paper used a Foucauldian “genealogical” approach (Loft, 1986; Kearins and Hooper, 
2002): by providing detailed insights on the Uniconti Commission experience in Italy on 
the base of a contextual analysis and an original archival documental sources listed in 
Appendix 1 (i.e. developing an accounting history research “grounded firmly in the 
archive”: Carnegie and Napier, 1996), the accounting discourse is revealed as a complex 
phenomenon, whose development and change are basically linked to the context and 
dependent on the interplay of many different influences (Stewart, 1992).  
As a first point, the research on the experience of the Uniconti Commission sheds light 
on the strenght of the State-interventionism embedded in the totalitarian ideology of 
Fascism in driving the setting of an uniform costing system. It provides evidence of the 
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forms in which the interventionist role/regulatory function of the State in the economy 
manifested at the time. In both the totalitarian regimes of Germany and Italy between the 
two World Wars the standardization in accounting - although differently in the two 
countries - assumed a role for the implementation of a planned political economy, 
rationalization and regulation of industries, particularly in Germany. Further, the process 
of accounting change was driven by the issue of the conduct of war, where accounting 
was implicated in the control of a constrained war-time economy. In this respect, the 
paper contributes to the themes of the establishment of the State as an arena for the 
development of the accounting discourse and practice through an extended intervention 
and regulation of economic processes in the last century (Hopwood et al., 1979; 
Hopwood, 1987; Canziani, 1994). Further, the role that ideology may play in the 
accounting discourse is also revealed by the influence the German ally had in the work of 
the Italian Uniconti Commission. The totalitarian political and ideological affinity 
between Italy and Germany at that time and the results achieved in the German experience 
of accounting standardization made the interaction between Italy and Germany in the 
Italian accounting rules setting process highly influencial, as resulting by the minutes of 
the meetings. Thus, in understanding the influence of the State on accounting, the 
Uniconti experience addresses the importance of the ideological foundation of the State 
for the consequences that this may occur in the process and direction of change in the 
accounting domain. 
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Secondly, the documented history of the Uniconti Commission shows the presence of a 
complex interplay of many different influences, which is at the base of the possibility to 
appreciate accounting as a social – not merely technical – activity (Loft, 1986), and 
accounting history as a complex, contextual and “plural” phenomenon - not a 
deterministic, unidimensional linear progress (Stewart, 1992). A frame of complexity and 
interconnection existing between ideology, knowledge, expectations and interests 
domains, accounting practices and their institutional contexts has emerged, providing in 
the research the picture that the “new accounting history” research aims to disclose in its 
approach (Miller et al., 1991).  
In considering the different actors that participated in the process described in the paper  
(Government, business representatives and academics) the documental analysis has 
unveiled the underpinning differences, objectives, means of bringing power relations into 
being that influenced the outcomes. Considering this, the study further extends the 
previous Italian article Cinquini et al. (2009). To this aim, additional evidence concerning 
the Italian government, the academicians and the business representatives have been 
extracted, analysed and interpreted. The “genealogical” perspective adopted in this paper 
has allowed to investigate in depth the power/knowledge relationships among the actors 
involved in designing the accounting rules.  
One first point in this respect concerns the multiplicity of objectives by Fascist 
Government in promoting the setting of the Italian uniform accounting and costing 
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systems. As we read in transparency through the letters discussed in the paper, this 
initiative was seen as the possibility of a “further step forward” toward the making of the 
‘fascist corporative economy’.  Although that choice was primarily promoted by the 
Italian Government for reasons correlated to the wartime need of control on job prices, in 
the context of the Fascist regime (or at least in part of their leaders), uniform costing 
appeared as a fundamental tool for implementing a new economic policy coherent with 
the corporative ideology. 
On the other hand, the circumstance that the uniform costing was promoted in Italy much 
later if compared to the German political ally explains why Germany was considered as 
the main reference for the Commission’s work since the very beginning of the initiative, 
and the importance given to the German experience. This difference in degree of 
development of the uniform costing design and implementation – as recalled in the paper 
- was due to the different economic policies of the two totalitarian regimes with respect 
to economy regulation. 
In the process of setting a new uniform accounting system narrated by the Uniconti 
experience, besides the Government also the relevance of the Italian entrepeneurs 
association (Confindustria) and the Italian academics emerges. 
Regarding entrepeneurs, if we consider the suspicions expressed by the Italian business 
representatives in several Commission meetings (due to the possible tax implications of 
accounting unification), it is clear how Confindustria had been trying to protect business 
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from the possible implications of the deployment of a discretionary inspection power 
exercised by the Ministry of Corporations in assessing business costs. This is also 
connected with the fear of industrials about a lack of professionalism both at industrial 
and Governmental level in making an appropriate ‘cost for pricing’ assessment by the 
uniform costing: it is emphasized how the accounting unification had been realized slowly 
in Germany and developed in a context that was technically prepared, while the position 
of Italy appeared backward (DOC. December 12, 1941). 
Concerning the role of the Italian academy, several foremost scholars took part in the 
Commission as long as it worked, thus contributing to add consistency to the scientific 
foundation of the solutions that were proposed. The Uniconti Commission constituted an 
opportunity for the Italian accounting community to offer a fine example of scientific 
contribution on relevant accounting and cost accounting themes. The Commission faced 
important issues, which represent prominent research areas in the accounting field still 
nowadays (e.g. if considering regulated sectors such as telecommunications, energy 
distribution or transports): normal profitability and profit, capital cost, cost allocation 
principles and techniques, asset evaluation. These issues, as the paper has pointed out, 
were discussed during the thirties in articles of the Italian Accounting Review and in 
textbooks by leading Italian scholars.  
In this perspective, the Uniconti Commission experience shows how in a political and 
ideological totalitarian context and in a wartime economy - that established restrictions 
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and targets (price control, planned economy) - a space was opened for economic and 
business doctrines to explore advancements with respect to principles, criteria and tools 
for accounting standardisation. The Italian doctrine offered its theoretical and technical 
knowledge to contribute in the identification of uniform accounting development. This 
happened without a detachment from the affirmed principles of Italian Economia 
aziendale, as the corporative ideology did not deny the role of private enterprise into 
economy and the legitimation of profit (Cinquini, 2007).  
As it has been illustrated and discussed in the paper, the interplay between the domains 
of politics and ideology, accounting knowledge and techniques and economic and social 
interests implied remarkable reflections on the outcomes of the Commission. 
This especially happened if considering the case of the rules on price setting. Price setting 
is characterized by high uncertainty and has not a unique solution justifiable in a technical 
perspective. In this case, the adoption of political stances can ultimately influence how 
rules of cost measurement are set and how cost-based prices are consequently determined. 
The cases discussed in the paper of depreciation and product costs-prices rules show 
clearly how the interests of each part involved in their design and implementation have 
been taken in consideration.  
Hence, the technical solutions adopted into the uniform costing system for pricing can be 
considered as a result of the interplay between actors and their objectives: the objectives 
of the business and accounting academy (economic rationality and technical coherence), 
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the interests of Business representatives (maintain profit), the dominant ideology (State 
regulated economy) and the political targets (price control). Power relations have been 
analyzed taking into account these types of objectives. The steps of the uniform costing 
system design where this process became more evident have been examined in the paper, 
claiming that the emerging cost accounting choices cannot be interpreted only through 
the lenses of the economic rationality and technical coherence.  
Finally, the paper addresses the experience of fixing uniform cost accounting principles 
in Italy in the last century, so contributing in the stream of accounting history research on 
the uniform accounting trends that affected industrialized countries since the beginning 
of the last century (Mueller, 1965).  
As noted above, the Uniconti Commission did not conclude its work because of the 
dramatic progress of the Second World War in Italy since 1943. As a consequence, not 
only we lack a complete picture of the outcomes of cost determination criteria in all the 
industrial sectors, but due to the radical changes in the institutional conditions and the 
new economic priorities after the war  - namely, the ‘post-war reconstruction’ phase - we 
have no practical application of the uniform costing principles for a real evaluation of 
their efficacy. Nevertheless, the judgement on the theoretical validity of the results of the 
work conducted by the Commission did not change among Italian academicians after the 
war, regardless of any reason that had inspired its establishment and of the possible 
political implications deriving by the involvement with the Fascist regime14. 
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More broadly, the research presented in this paper shows the relevance of an archival 
accounting history research in the perspective of “new” accounting history. In particular, 
the case of the Uniconti Commission addresses the potential of this approach applied to 
the accounting history in the context of the totalitarian States of the last century, a context 
which is still not widely studied. Away from taken-for-granted or a-priori judgements, a 
focus on accounting within these contexts in the perpective proposed in this paper may 
reveal to some extent unexpected and fruitful results, confirming the richness, complexity 
and un-linearity of the process of accounting change in historical perspective.  
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Appendix 1 - Archival Sources examined 
 
Acronym Date Title (English translation) Notes 
DOC. December 12, 1941 
"Promemoria per il direttore: Unificazione della contabilità 
aziendale" (Memo for the Director: Uniform accounting)  
DOC. January16, 1942 
"Appunto per il direttore dell'ufficio "Servizi generali della 
direzione": Riunione preparatoria di Milano alla seduta del 
15.1.1942" (Note for the Director of "Direction general 
services": Preparatory meeting of Milan at the meeting of 
15.1.1942”)  
 
DOC. January28, 1942 
"Utilizzazione degli ammortamenti delle imprese industriali 
per il finanziamento della guerra" (Use of the amortizations of 
industrial companies for financing the war) 
Studio dell'ufficio 
"Servizi generali della 
direzione" 
DOC. March 1942 "Relazione di Guido Carli sul viaggio in Germania" (Report of Guido Carli on his journey to Germany)  
DOC. May26, 1942 
"Processo verbale della seconda riunione tenutasi presso la 
Confederazione Fascista degli Industriali" (Minutes of the 
second meeting held by the Fascist Confederation of 
Industrialists) 
 
DOC. May26/27, 1942 
Convegno fra la ReichsgruppeIndustrie e la Confindustria, 
Roma (Conference between ReichsgruppeIndustie and 
Confindustria, Rome) 
 
DOC. November9, 1942 "Appunto per il direttore" (Note for the Director)  
DOC. 1942 
"Note illustrative dello schema generale della contabilità 
unificata" (Explanatory notes on the general unified 
accounting scheme) 
Stabilimento Grafico 
Tiberino, Roma 
DOC. 1942 
"Criteri per la determinazione dei costi come base per la 
fissazione dei prezzi dei prodotti nelle vendite da parte della 
industria" (Costing principles to be used as a basis for fixing 
the prices of products to be sold by the industry) 
Stabilimento Grafico 
Tiberino, Roma 
DOC. n.d. 
"Prima relazione al Ministro delle Corporazioni sulla 
unificazione della contabilità in Germania" (First report to the 
Minister of Corporationson the unification of accounting in 
Germany) 
 
DOC. n.d. 
"Ordinamento della contabilità generale e delle 
determinazioni dei costi nelle aziende dell'industria 
siderurgica e metallurgica" (General accounting and costing 
regulations applicable to the iron and steel industry) 
  
DOC. n.d. 
"Posizione della contabilità nel quadro del movimento tedesco 
di razionalizzazione" (Position of accounting in the framework 
of the German rationalization movement) 
  
DOC. n.d. 
"Osservazioni sul costo di produzione da considerare agli 
effetti della determinazione del prezzo di vendita" 
(Observations on production cost to be considered for price 
setting) 
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DOC. n.d. "Appunto: Ordine di discussione" (Note: Order of discussion)  
DOC. n.d. 
"Osservazioni sui criteri di determinazione dei costi proposti 
dalla Commissione per l'unificazione della contabilità" 
(Observations on costing criteria proposed by the Commission 
for uniform accounting) 
 
DOC. n.d. "Tabulati per la contabilità unificata" (Printouts for uniform accounting)  
LET. December 29, 1941 
Letter from Minister of Corporations (Renato Ricci) to: 
Ministerof Finance, Fascist Party National Directorate, 
Minister of Justice (Achille Grandi) and President of the 
Council of Ministers  
LET. January10, 1942 
Letter from Minister of Justice (Achille Grandi) to Minister of 
Corporations (Renato Ricci)  
LET. January12, 1942 Letter to Minister of Corporations (Renato Ricci)  
LET. February19, 1942 
Letter from Industrial Fascist Corporation Director (Giovanni 
Balella) to Minister of Corporations (Renato Ricci)  
LET. June 1942 Letter from Uniconti Commission secretary (Guido Carli) to Minister of Corporations (Renato Ricci)  
MIN. December, 13 1941 Minutes of Uniconti Commission meeting 1st meeting 
MIN. December, 22 1941 Minutes of Uniconti Commission meeting 
2nd meeting (with 
hydroelectric power 
plants) 
MIN. December, 23 1941 Minutes of Uniconti Commission meeting 
3rd meeting (with wollen 
textile producers) 
MIN. January, 15 1942 Minutes of Uniconti Commission meeting 
4th meeting (with 
steelworks) 
MIN. April 30, 1942 Minutes of Uniconti Commission meeting 10th meeting 
MIN. May1, 1942 Minutes of Uniconti Commission meeting 11th meeting 
 
DOC.= Document 
LET.= Letter 
MIN.= Minutes 
n.d. = no date 
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Appendix 2 – Meetings of the 23 Sub- Commissions created in 1942 (until 
November 7, 1942) 
 
Sub-Commission Number of members First call Second call Third call 
Wool 8 July 27 5 September  
Silk 8 July 27 August 3 September 2 
Canvas, Linen and flowers 5 July 27 September 9  
Textiles 12 July 27 September 5  
Cotton 6 July 27 September 10 September 29 
Carbonated water 6 August 3 September 4  
Food and agriculture 13 August 3 September 5  
Hydrothermal 5 August 3 September 15  
Milk, Pasta, Rice, etc. 19 August 3 September 9/10  
Wine, alcohol and the like 6 August 4 September 11 October 15 
Sugar 6 August 4 September 12  
Electrical communications 5 August 10 September 15  
Electrical companies 8 August 10 September 16  
Artificial textile fibres 5 September 2 September 28  
Glass and ceramics 4 September 3 October 15  
Chemicals 80 September3 September 14 
September 29 / 
October 1 
October 2/3 
October 16/17/23 
 
Iron and Steel 17 September 6/7   
Cement, Plaster, Lime and 
Bricks 8 September 16 October 21  
Building 4 September 16   
Wood 4 September 16 October 20  
Mining 9 September 14 October 22  
Marble and stone 6 September 14 October 23  
Mechanical 91 September 18/19/30   
 Total 335    
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Notes 
1In the U.K. cost standardization was promoted in specific industries or economic categories with the 
objective to improve price control and at the same time preventing their reduction below manufacturing 
costs (Mitchell and Walker, 1996 and 1997). In France, the uniform costing issue arose in the same way 
and about at the same time (i.e. at the turn of the 20th century) as in UK. Here, the Cegos (General 
Commission on the Scientific Organisation of Labour) gave a fundamental contribution in proposing to 
standardize cost calculation. Formed mainly by engineers and entrepeneurs representatives, the Cegos’ 
main goal was to spread and improve rational organization methods (Zelinschi, 2009). In the United States, 
the printers’ association issued a Standard Uniform Cost Finding System for Printers in 1910, as an attempt 
at considering the problem of the “increased production costs and consequent increased rates” (Solomons, 
1950: 239). 
2 The documentation at the base of this research is filed in the historical archives of Confindustria b.94, f.1 
– Unificazione della contabilità e costi di produzione (Bazzichi and Vommaro, 1990). The following 
acronyms will be used throughout the paper: MIN. = minutes, DOC. = document, LET. = letter.  
3The construction of “corporative economy” was presented as an alternative to socialism and as a model 
for overcoming both “liberal economics” and the “Marxist class struggle”. “Corporative economy” would 
have been implemented through a self-government of the representatives of economic categories of 
different trade and industrial sectors (Fascist corporations), which should be established as organs of the 
government, without abolishing private companies but regulating and planning the economic activities. 
Most historiographers agree that Corporatism was essentially a sound theoretical construction, but totally 
unrealized: the Charter of Work (issued on April 30th, 1927) – i.e. the Economic Constitution of Fascism 
that outlined the basis of the Fascist corporative system - was considered by eminent jurists to be a 
presentation of principles that lacked mandatory effects. One evidence of the distance between corporative 
principles and the practice of government action is the fact per se that corporative institutes were created 
later and had no further power of enforcement: the 1926 decrees issued to create Fascist corporations and 
the relevant ministry remained inoperative, only in 1930 a National Council of Corporations was founded, 
while fascist corporations were not created until 1934 (Cassese, 1974; De Felice, 2001:  p. 11). 
4Zappa was an innovator of accounting content in Italy and stressed quantitative determinations as the focus 
of this discipline. We refer here briefly about his contribution in Italian accounting thought, leaving the 
deepening by the references reported. In Zappa’s view the central accounting issue is income determination. 
His idea shifts the principal focus of attention from the balance sheet to the income statement, i.e. the 
recognition of the relevance of the income statement and the dynamic aspect of accounting for income 
calculation, therefore proposing a new ‘sistema del reddito’ (income-based accounting system) (Zappa, 
1937). In this way, he breaks away from the vision of an income statement as an aggregation of ‘partial 
results’ linked by specific individual assets (Besta, 1922); instead, income is seen to arise from the entire 
complex of transactions, and cannot be referred to separate individual assets or classes of assets. However, 
these could not live separately from business organisation and management, otherwise outcome would have 
been pure formalism: Zappa believed that organisation and management disciplines should be joined to 
accounting (Zappa, 1927: p. 20). Economia aziendale is therefore an overall doctrine, regarding business 
as a complex whole; its main features can be summarised in these general points (Flower, 1996: pp. 181–
182): it covers all forms of economic organisation at all levels (the house-hold, the business firms, public 
enterprises and towns, up to the State). The word azienda is a generic term, often translated as ‘concern’; it 
aims at developing the general principles that govern the equilibrium of the azienda as a coherent unity. 
Zappa’s contribution is characterised by a ‘radical holistic approach’ based on a ‘unitary view of the 
azienda’ (see: Canziani, 1994; Flower, 1996; Galassi, 2002; Zan, 1994).  
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5 See Cinquini, 2007 to deepen the contribution of these scholars within the influence of Fascist ideology 
in Italy. 
6 “(…) there is a generally acknowledged limitation of the ‘political principle’: all (Italian) scholars reaffirm 
the need for the independence of management principles in the firm. This basic condition was to be applied 
to the fascist corporation regulative regime as well: ‘fascist corporations’ should remain outside the 
boundaries of business management, both in terms of doctrinal references and in terms of the practice of 
the corporative experience.”(Cinquini, 2007: p.234) 
7An analysis of archival evidence revealed that the following professors took part in that meetings: Giovanni 
Balella, Teodoro D’Ippolito, Carlo Fabrizi, Giancarlo Frè, Remo Malinverni, Pietro Onida, Francesco 
Maria Pacces, Renato Teani, Mario Saibante, and Pasquale Saraceno. Attending chartered accountants 
were: Ghezzi, Ghiglione, and Maggiore. Guido Carli, future governor of the Bank of Italy, was the secretary 
of the Commission. Some meetings also saw the presence of manufacturers, such as hydroelectric power 
plants (Edison, Adriatica, Sip, Valdarno, Terni), woollen textile producers (Marzotto, Rivetti, Tollegno) 
and steelworks (Finsider, Ilva, Terni, S.I.A.C., Dalmine, Falck, Fiat, Breda). 
8 The following academicians were involved: Giovanni Balella, Teodoro D’Ippolito, Carlo Fabrizi, 
Giancarlo Frè, Remo Malinverni, Pietro Onida, Francesco Maria Pacces, Renato Teani, Mario Saibante, 
and Pasquale Saraceno. Four of them will be fundamental references in the post WWII development of 
accounting and business studies in Italy: Pietro Onida, Teodoro D’Ippolito, Pasquale Saraceno (all Gino 
Zappa’s scholars) and Federico M. Pacces. 
9 DOC., “First report to the Minister of Corporations on the unification of accounting in Germany”. 
10 It is the agreement of October 2, 1925 stipulated between Confindustria and the Fascist labour union. 
With this agreement, the industrial sector recognized the Fascist labour union as the only representative of 
workers. This was the first step of the Fascist regime towards a total control and regulation of trade-union 
activities. 
11 The cost accounting rules proposed by the Commission reflect the main point of Zappa’s thought centered 
on ‘unitary view of the azienda’ Another evidence of this coherence is in the document “Iron and steel 
industry cost regulation” analyzed in the next section, where is stated that one of the aim of the document 
is the (p.1): “(…) final determination of costs, revenues and results that can be abstractly allocated to the 
productions considered”. The term “abstractly” seems just recalling the Zappa’s ‘radical holistic approach’ 
(see footnote 4). 
12 Differently De Minico and D’Ippolito, (1943: p.65) interpret the acceptable price proposed in the 
document as the result of economic-technical-cost plus a remuneration for the general economic business 
risk. 
13 In the documents and internal reports used by the Commission, the position of the two Authors is in line 
with the German position. See. Carli (1941: pp. 22-23); DOC., “First report to the Ministry of  Corporations 
on the German uniform accounting process”, internal report of the Uniconti Commission, pp. 36-37. Based 
on this documentary evidence, we can see how the decree issued on March 5, 1940 by the Reich’s 
Commissioner had established criteria for the determination of economic results obtained by the businesses 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether these exceeded normal results and therefore could be considered, 
to a certain extent, as over-profits. Moreover, business owners were liable and required to review the prices, 
costs and profits of their organisations during the war period (Preisbilanz) and, if they had obtained over-
profits, they had to transfer them to the Uffici di Finanza (Finance offices), thus adjusting prices to costs. 
14As two of the major Italian scholars stated: “The cost determination criteria proposed by the 
abovementioned Commission, though in their close connection with the companies’ daily lives and 
flexibility, reflect the results of the stated theories” (D’Ippolito, 1952: pp. 41-42). “The financial accounting 
scheme proposed for the manufacturing industry (…) is the original, simple but effective, output of Italian 
minds. It is appropriate for both small/medium concerns and for the largest industrial corporations, because 
it includes reductions to be adapted to different requirements. But, most of all, it corresponds to the most 
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recent developments in bookeeping and business statistics theories”. (De Minico and D’Ippolito, 1943: p. 
73). See also Amodeo, 1964: pp. 989 ff. 
